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DEMOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
In this article, we explore the demo-
graphic future of the world with a focus on 
scenarios for Russia and Germany. We seek 
an alternative to the Western standards of 
scenarios for global demographic develop-
ment. We consider demographic develop-
ment both in a positive and negative sense. 
Our analysis rests on such theoretical struc-
tures as the general theory of population, 
the classical theory of demographic transi-
tion, the concepts of the ‘second’, ‘third’, 
and ‘fourth’ demographic transitions, and 
scenarios for the ‘Eurasian demographic 
development path’. We employ a range of 
methods from comparative demography as 
well as historical analogies, expert evalua-
tions and demographic forecasts. We analy-
se the patterns of current demographic de-
velopment in Russia and Germany to explo-
re various demographic scenarios. 
In the conclusion, we stress the need for 
Russia and other countries, including Ger-
many, to embark on the ‘Eurasian demogra-
phic development path’ in view of the count-
ries’ geographical positions and demogra-
phic values, with children being a dominant 
one. Otherwise, both Germany and Russia 
may disappear as national states as early as 
this century. The findings of this study can 
be used to improve the demographic poli-
cies of Russia and Germany. 
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Introduction 
 
We would like to begin with a quote from T. Sarazzin’s book 
Germany is Abolishing Itself: ‘A cynic might argue: they [migrants] can 
do all the lowly jobs — for instance, the bearing and rearing of children — 
that Germans are reluctant to take… The childless or child-poor German 
middle and upper classes live comfortably in their suburbs and decorate 
old buildings. They have not even registered the fact, but the land is 
changing beyond all recognition due to demographic developments and 
Germany is threatening to abandon itself, to put it mildly. When they do 
notice it, it could be too late. As G. Hegel poetically and darkly wrote, 
“The Owl of Minerva first takes flight with twilight closing in”.’1 At the 
end of the article, we will propose a scenario that will deter the great state 
of Germany and the equally great state of Russia from ‘abolishing them-
selves’. This is up to the politicians and people living in these countries, 
the fates of which have become so closely intertwined in the history of 
civilisations. 
We must make several important remarks regarding the concepts of 
‘demographic development’, the ‘Eurasian path of demographic deve-
lopment’, and ‘demographic crisis’. 
Demographic development is usually associated with a continuous 
ascent. However, ‘demographic development’ is a more complex phe-
nomenon that comprises both positive and negative determinants [2, 
pp. 78—79]. Moreover, the world population has been shaped by these 
determinants throughout its history. At different stages, these determining 
factors have different weights. We believe that today’s demographic de-
velopment of the countries of the West, some Asian states, and Russia, is 
dominated by negative determinants that amount to a demographic crisis. 
The demographic crisis started in 1963 in the US [3]. Later, at the 
turn of the 1970s, it spread across Western Europe. The crisis manifests 
itself not only in quantitative negative changes, primarily in the marriage 
and birth rates (which corresponds to the second demographic transition 
                                                     
1 Ein Zyniker könnte argumentieren: Die können dann auch all die anderen nied-
rigen Arbeiten verrichten, die viele Deutsche — wie die Zeugung und Aufzucht 
von Kindern — nicht gerne selber erledigen… Die deutsche Mittel- und Ober-
schicht lebt dagegen kinderlos oder kinderarm und komfortabel in ihren Vor-
stadtvillen und schmucken Altbauwohnungen. Sie registriert nicht einmal, dass 
sich das Land infolge der demografischen Entwicklung bis zur Unkenntlichkeit 
verändert, dass es sich selbst aufzugeben droht — um das Mindeste zu sagen. 
Wenn sie es merkt, könnte es zu spät sein. Wie sagt Hegel so poetisch und so 
dunkel: „Die Eule der Minerva beginnt erst mit der einbrechenden Dämmerung 
ihren Flug“. (Sarrazin T. 2010. Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land 
aufs Spiel setzen. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, p. 361). 
Demography 
6 
concept formulated by Ron Lesthaeghe [5] and Dirk van de Kaa [4]), 
there are both negative structural (sex and age) and qualitative (demogra-
phic behaviour, reproductive health and spirituality) changes in the popu-
lation. The demographic crisis in today’s Europe was described in detail 
in a recent article by the famous Hungarian-American demographer Paul 
Demeny. However, he did not address the third component of the pheno-
menon, which we believe to be the most important [6, pp. 111—114] — 
the negative qualitative changes in the demographic development both in 
Russia and in many developed countries of the world. 
We are convinced that the demographic crisis can be overcome, at 
least in Russia, through treading the Eurasian path of demographic de-
velopment — a combination of different models. One of them is that of 
fourth demographic transition, which we will consider in detail below, 
alongside the idea of Eurasianism. 
 
Statistical data and methods of research 
 
This study employs the official data on socio-demographic measures 
from Russia’s Federal Service for State Statistics (Rosstat). These are the 
results of 2002 and 2010 national censuses, the Statistical Yearbook of 
Russia, Rosstat’s statistical reports ‘Natural Population Change in the 
Russian Federation’ and ‘Population Number and Migration in the Rus-
sian Federation’, the Russian Demographic Data Sheet 2016, and a num-
ber of other Russian sources published over the past 20 years. The statis-
tics for Germany are taken from the data of the Federal Statistical Office 
of Germany, the US Central Intelligence Agency, the World Population 
Prospects, and the Human Mortality Database. 
In using these data and employing the method of comparative demog-
raphy (a range of demographic measures and rates), we corroborated the 
conclusions made in the course of empirical observations and the analysis 
thereof. The examination of the total fertility rate demonstrates that Rus-
sia and Germany have relatively similar fertility rates (see Tables 1 and 2). 
However, if we consider the development prospects, the process of age-
ing, and the territorial factors, Russia might seem to be faced with a more 
complicated situation. 
As to the mortality rate, cross-country comparisons largely use such 
an indicator as life expectancy at birth (LEB). Our forecast, based on an 
analysis of the current trends and life tables and the extrapolation meth-
od, shows that, by 2050, LEB in Germany will reach 90.6 years for both 
sexes (90 years in males, and 91.6 years in females), whereas LEB in Rus-
sia will be 75.7 years for both sexes (69.9 years in males and 80.7 years 
in females). The forecasted gap once again stresses the need for Russia to 
adopt a nation-saving lifestyle, which is the essence of the Eurasian path 
of demographic development. 
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Table 1 
 
The total fertility rate in 2017 in selected countries 
 
Developed countries Baltic region Eurasia Developing  countries 
France — 2.07 
UK — 1.88 
US — 1.87 
Netherlands — 1.78 
Belgium — 1.78 
Australia — 1.77 
Canada — 1.60 
Switzerland — 1.56 
Italy — 1.44 
South Korea — 1.44 
Sweden — 1.88 
Norway — 1.85 
Finland — 1.75 
Denmark — 1.73
Estonia — 1.60 
Lithuania — 1.59
Latvia — 1.51 
Germany — 1.45 
(1.60) 
Poland — 1.35 
Tajikistan — 2.63 
Kirgizia — 2.61 
Kazakhstan — 2.25
Uzbekistan — 1.76
Armenia — 1.64 
Russia* — 1.61 
(1.62) 
China — 1.60 
Belarus — 1.48 
Turkey — 2.01 
Nicaragua — 1.89 
Vietnam — 1.81 
Chile — 1.80 
Iran — 1.87 
Brazil — 1.75 
Thailand — 1.52 
 
* Russia is also a Baltic region state. 
The data of national statistical services are given in brackets. 
Prepared based on The World Factbook by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). 2018. 
 
Cross-country migration analyses usually employ such an indicator as 
net migration per 1,000 population. As Table 2 shows, Germany has been 
outperforming Russia in terms of net migration over the past 12 years. 
Immigration is both Germany’s advantage and a phenomenon harbouring 
a threat of the native population being replaced by immigrants (cf. ‘third 
demographic transition’ concept). As to Russia, the forecast prepared by 
the Russian researchers D. Ediev and S. Shulgin and colleagues2 predicts 
that, by 2035, the projected population number will reach 141.1 million 
people at zero migration or 146.5 million people with migration taken 
into account. Thus, at the moment, there is little hope of 270,000—
300,000 immigrants per year coming to the country (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 
 
The main demographic measures of Russia and Germany, million people 
 
 1995 2005 2015 Russia Germany Russia Germany Russia Germany 
Total number of births 1.363 0.765 1.457 0.686 1.940 0.738 
Total number of deaths 2.203 0.885 2.303 0.830 2.030 0.925 
                                                     
2 See the Russian Demographic Data Sheet 2016. Russian Presidential Academy 
of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), the Federal State 
Statistics Service (Rosstat), and International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA): Moscow, Russia and Laxenburg, Austria, 2016. 
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End of Table 2 
 
 1995 2005 2015 Russia Germany Russia Germany Russia Germany 
Natural increase/de-
cline – 0.840 – 0.120 – 0.846 – 0.144 – 0.090 – 0.188 
TFR* 1.34 1.25 1.29 1.34 1.77 1.50 
LE* 64.5 76.4 65.4 78.9 71.3 81.1 
Total size of the re-
sident population, 
as of the beginning 
of the year 147.938 81.538 143.801 82.501 146.267 81.198 
Number of females 78.5 41.893 77.1 42.148 78.5 41.362 
Number of males 69.5 39.645 66.7 40.353 67.8 39.836 
Age groups  
(years)**: 
 
 
34.03** 
(23.0 %) 
 
 
17.53 
(21.5 %) 
 
 
34.32 
(23.9 %) 
 
 
16.75 
(20.3 %) 
 
 
31.22 
(21.3 %) 
 
 
14.78 
(18.2 %) 
0—19 
20—59 84.03** 
(56.8 %) 
47.13 
(57.8 %) 
84.46 
(58.7 %) 
45.21 
(54.8 %) 
85.98 
(58.8 %) 
44.17 
(54.4 %) 
60 and over 29.88** 
(20.2 %) 
16.88 
(20.7 %) 
25.02 
(17.4 %) 
20.54 
(24.9 %) 
29.07 
(19.9 %) 
22.25 
(27.4 %) 
Net migration 0.503 0.398 0.282 0.790 0.228 1.139 
 
* TFR is the total fertility rate (the average number of birth per a woman of 
childbearing age). LEB is life expectancy at birth (years). 
** Age groups for Russia in 1995: 0—15 years, males aged 16—59 years 
and females aged 16—54 years, males aged 60 years and over and females aged 
55 years and over. 
Prepared based on data from Russia’s Federal Service for State Statistics 
(Rosstat). URL: http://www gks.ru and from the Federal Statistical Office of 
Germany. URL.: https://www.destatis.de 
 
Demographic development theories  
and concepts behind different demographic scenarios 
 
The general theory of the classical demographic transition has not on-
ly gained wide currency but it is also being imposed by the Western 
countries upon the international community. However, the question arises 
whether the other states have to copy slavishly the Western model of de-
mographic development. The central thesis of this theory holds that all 
the countries without exception have to go through the four stages of de-
mographic transition. This was emphasised as early as the 1970s by the 
famous Australian demographer John Caldwell. In his analysis of the 
demographic transition in developing countries, he emphasised the 
‘Westernization’ of fertility [7]. He also stressed that, in theory, the de-
V. A. Iontsev, A. A. Subbotin 
9 
mographic transition was not a universal process. The pervasiveness of 
the transition, which is involving a growing number of developing coun-
tries, is a result of their mindless imitation of social relations, worldview, 
and lifestyle stemming from the West, primarily the US and Western Eu-
rope. Moreover, such ‘borrowings’ are possible only as part of the indus-
trial transformation of society [7]. Some countries that have not complet-
ed the fourth stage of the classical demographic transition (for example, 
Poland, Latvia, Estonia, etc.) are trying to skip to the fifth stage of the 
‘Western model’ (the second demographic transition). The latter means 
the dead-end road to demographic extinction, which is looming for coun-
tries with small populations. 
The process of ‘imposing’ negative Western demographic standards 
on less developed countries has gained momentum in the recent 30 years, 
as the global information space is being drawn into the World Wide Web. 
Among these standards, the emergence of the so-called nuclear fami-
ly raises the greatest concern. The reproductive goals of such a family are 
changing dramatically to the worse. ‘One family — one child’ has be-
come the dominant model. In a short-time perspective, it may turn into a 
childless family, i. e. one that rejects the idea of bearing children. Accord-
ing to the director of the Berlin Institute for Population and Development, 
Reiner Klingholz, childless families accounted for 15 % of all German 
families in 2012 [8, p. 8]. This proportion is similar in other developed 
countries. To a degree, this situation is brought about by the childfree 
movement, which — having appeared in the US in 1993 and planted in 
the rich European soil of sexual revolution — rapidly spread across 
Western Europe. Unfortunately, in 2006, this movement appeared in 
Russia too. In effect, this and similar movements advocate a conscious 
rejection of childbirth or ‘personal freedoms without children’. If one 
takes into account a steep increase in the number of quasi-families — 
egalitarian families, cohabitation unions, and same-sex families (same-
sex marriages have already been legalised in 16 European countries and 
throughout the United States), one start questioning the demographic fu-
ture of these countries. Why should all these ‘charms’ — which, if noth-
ing changes, will inevitably lead to ‘the Death of the West’ [1; 3; 9] — be 
imposed upon the whole world? Probably, this is done to expedite the 
absurd idea of the ‘world domination’ without damaging the environment 
and natural resources. Why should one spend trillions of dollars on ar-
maments, when one can simply change the minds of new generations so 
that they start killing themselves demographically? However, this does 
not mean that Germany and most European countries will be part of this 
‘world dominion’. Probably, the above explains the negative demograph-
ic changes observed across Europe since the 1960s-1970s. One of the 
first affected states was Germany, where the natural decline in the native 
population (i. e. the mortality rate exceeding the birth rate took place) was 
first observed in 1971. The trend continues and is expected to accelerate 
(see Table 2). 
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The slow but sure homicide has already begun. It is aggravated by the 
Internet, which — alongside other forms of the information technology — 
has become a tool in the information war waged by a small group of de-
veloped countries, primarily, the US and the UK, on less developed states 
[10; 11]. The Russian philosopher A. A. Zinoviev, who had spent many 
years in Germany, was among the first to consider the consequences of 
this war. In particular, he wrote, ‘the bomb of Westernisation, which ex-
ploded in Russia, caused unprecedented devastation not only in the 
spheres of statehood, economy, ideology, and culture but also in the very 
human material of society (our italics). At such a scale and in such a 
short time, it had never been done by any conqueror or by any weapon. 
Designed by its inventors to defeat communism, the ‘bomb of Westerni-
sation’ turned out to be a much more powerful weapon — it destroyed 
the centuries-old robust union of people’ [12, pp. 11—12]. This thesis is 
open to debate. However, the possible highly negative influence of in-
formation technology on human minds has become a reality. This reality 
is especially pronounced when it comes to demographic behaviour. Mo-
reover, the changes are occurring at the genetic level, which was stressed 
by V. I. Danilov-Danilyan, who wrote about ‘genetically distorted decay-
bringing individuals’ that pose ‘a threat to the humanity as dangerous as 
the degradation and demise of the environment’ [13, pp. 474—475]. 
The consequences of the ‘Westernisation’ of fertility are felt not only in 
developing but also developed countries (see Table 1). Especially conspi-
cuous is the decrease in the fertility below the replacement level (2.15 chil-
dren per a woman of fertile age) in Italy and Poland, where the traditions 
are becoming blurred and the Western lifestyle is being imposed upon the 
population. All this has virtually resulted in a demographic crisis. 
 
The famous demographer David Coleman believes that the increase 
in fertility to 2.0 observed in some countries of the West, for example, Fran-
ce, may herald the Western demographic renaissance [14, pp. 107—115]. 
Nevertheless, such a renaissance seems questionable if today’s negative 
qualitative changes in the Western population continue. Swedish kinder-
gartens instil into children, who start associating their sex with certain 
somatic and behavioural characteristics as early as age 3—4, the per-
ception of themselves as sexless creatures. Sexlessness is being increas-
ingly imposed upon people. In particular, this is achieved by the ‘mind-
less’ and broad use of the concept of ‘gender’ as the ‘social sex’. The term 
‘economic sex’3 was coined by some Russian gender scholars. It is very 
                                                     
3 See, for instance, Kalabikhina I. E. Ekonomiko-demograficheskoe razvitie Ros-
sii: gendernyi aspekt. Doktorskaya dissertatsiya na soiskanie uchenoy stepeni 
doktora ekonomicheskikh nauk [The Economico-Demographic Development of 
Russia: The Gender Aspect: A Postdoctoral Thesis]. Moscow, 2010, pp. 36—36. 
Is not it symbolic that, in this work, the word ‘gender’ is every now and then 
autocorrected to ‘tender’? 
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difficult to imagine a more dangerous anti-demographic notion. In 2017, 
Germany officially recognised a ‘third sex’. Against this background, it is 
not surprising that the number of same-sex marriages and quasi-families, 
which are a priori unable to contribute to population replacement, is in-
creasing. Adoption by such marital unions can end in a tragedy for the 
adopted children. 
Although fertility is increasing in the West, none of the Western 
countries has achieved the replacement level (2.15). A special role in this 
process is played by numerous immigrants, most of whom naturalise. 
Among immigrants, the fertility rate is much higher than among the na-
tive population. For instance, the fertility rate among the Turkish popula-
tion exceeds that of the German native population three or fourfold. 
Probably, it is not a coincidence that, as the Turkish community in Ger-
many has grown (the number of Turks naturalised as Germans exceeded 
3 million people). The total fertility rate increased from 1.34 in 2005 to 
1.5 in 2017. Thus, the process of the native population being replaced by 
immigrants — Coleman described the phenomenon as early as 2006 in 
his concept of the‘third demographic transition’ [15, p. 402—407] — 
continued and even accelerated. 
The concept of the ‘third demographic transition’ offers a demo-
graphic scenario for the developed countries. It suggests that if the cur-
rent trends continue, the native population may be completely replaced 
by immigrants. The countries will remain, although they will change their 
identity and culture. To prevent it, Coleman suggests banning or limiting 
the new waves of migration from developing countries. To what degree is 
this possible in today’s globalising world? We believe that since the 
world has been set in a continuous migration motion (for more detail, see 
[16]), which is crucial for future development, migrations cannot be 
stopped by any ‘iron curtain’. With all the reservations, this scenario can 
be perceived as a warning of to what the underestimation of the demo-
graphic factor in the development of the world, its regions, and its coun-
tries may lead. 
Unfortunately, the ‘Western charms’ are spreading across Russia — 
from the Far East to the Kaliningrad region. It is important to understand 
that Russia has unique demographic features. Firstly, the country has a 
vast territory of over 17 million sq km, which cannot be cultivated with-
out ‘extra hands’. This holds true for not only the northern regions and 
Siberia but also the central part of the country, where hundreds of thou-
sands of sq km of non-black-earth lands have been virtually depopulated. 
Secondly, Russia has completely exhausted its domestic demographic 
potential. There is not a single region in the country that can contribute to 
the population of desolate territories, as was the case in the imperial and 
Soviet periods. All this lends urgency to the problem of Russia’s demo-
graphic future. 
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Choosing the Eurasian path of demographic development 
 
All the above gives rise to the questions as to what path of demo-
graphic development should a country choose and whether this should be 
the Western path or an original one taking into account a country’s loca-
tion, traditions, demographic and cultural values, religious beliefs, histor-
ical experience, and many other factors. As of today, the second path has 
been chosen by very few states. These are, for example, China and North 
Korea. These considerations lend urgency to the problem of the Eurasian 
demographic development (Eurasian demographic transition) of Russia 
and the neighbouring countries. Although these countries trod the West-
ern path of demographic development (the second demographic transi-
tion), they are advocating the idea of Eurasianism. Remarkably, the Pres-
ident of Russia Vladimir V. Putin proposed the creation of a big Eurasian 
partnership in his speech at the Saint Petersburg International Economic 
Forum held on June 16—18, 2016 [17]. It was not the first time President 
Putin had addressed the idea of Eurasianism. In April 2012, he stressed 
that ‘Eurasianism is a tradition in our political thought. It established it-
self in Russia a long time ago and, today; it is being given a new dimen-
sion’ [18]. 
This idea did not simply establish itself in Russia as early as the 
1920s. Russia is a unique country. Its location, or mestorazvitie4, as Lev 
Gumilev put it [19, p. 10], in Europe before the Ural Mountains and in 
Asia behind them — and its mentality (the double-headed eagle) make it 
a truly Eurasian state, the Core of the Eurasian space. Russia’s geograph-
ical location between the West and the East translates into its Core posi-
tion. The causes of the revival of Eurasianism were considered by Prof. 
M. L. Titarenko. Not long before his death in February, 2016, he wrote, 
‘we are interested in the essence of new Eurasianism, which was the fo-
cus of post-Soviet ideo-political discussions and a key element in the 
search for a national idea that would ensure Russia’s cohesion and pros-
perity amid the aggressive cultural and civilizational expansion of the 
West. This expansion resulted in the considerable blurring of the cultural 
and civilizational self-identity, apoliticisation, the spiritual depression of 
the Russian people and the other ethnicities of the Russian Federation, 
the germinating ideas of local separatism and regional isolationism, and 
the emergence and aggravation of ethnic tensions’ [20, p. 2]. As men-
tioned above, all this had an extremely negative effect on the demograph-
ic behaviour of the Russian population. None of its numerous nationali-
ties and peoples was spared and the country found itself pushed towards 
the path of second demographic transition. 
                                                     
4 The term is usually translated as ‘developmental space’ or ‘topogenesis’. 
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Although opposing the idea of the Western path of demographic de-
velopment, in particular, that of the second demographic development, 
we do not reject it completely. The countries of Western Europe were the 
first to achieve a notable demographic success. Having strengthened the 
institution of family and having secured a relatively high fertility rate, 
these states managed to dramatically reduce the mortality rate. All this 
translated into the100 years of the so-called European demographic ex-
plosion, which began in the 1830s. It was accompanied by a decrease in 
infant and maternal mortality, an increase in life expectancy, and the im-
provement of physical health. However, contrary to common sense, these 
and other demographic achievements underwent dramatic negative 
changes at the turn of the 1970s to cater for the interests of large capital 
and the consumer society. These trends constituted the concept of the 
second demographic transitions, which is being imposed upon the world. 
The central element of the concept is the transition to a nuclear family 
that either has one child or is childless. However, when developing this 
concept, van de Kaa emphasised that it applied only to the developed Eu-
ropean countries. Thus, he forgot in some mysterious way about the US — 
the absolute champion in imposing mass culture and the quasi-family 
models (this imposition was especially pronounced under Presidents 
Clinton and Obama). 
The Eurasian demographic transition, on the contrary, suggests fol-
lowing the best national traditions of the ‘multiplication and preserva-
tion’ of the population, (M. V. Lomonosov wrote on the issue in the con-
text of Russia as early as the 18th century) [21], while adopting the best 
European achievements. This is the essence of the ‘phenomenon of Eura-
sianism’, which, as Titarenko stressed, ‘embraces elements that are char-
acteristic of not only the cultures of the peoples of Eurasia. Eurasianism 
postulates equality and horizontal relations between different cultures, 
whereas Eurocentrism postulates vertical relations, thus recognising one 
culture as superior and the others as inferior. The stratagem of Eurocen-
trism considers the assimilation of other cultures and the extinction of 
unique small cultures as a normal and inevitable phenomenon. It de-
mands that original systems of cultural values be replaced with some 
‘universal’ ones, which, in effect, are nothing else but the values of Wes-
tern mass culture’ [22, p. 4]. 
To gain a better understanding of these values, one may address the 
book of the eminent US politician Patrick Buchanan The Death of the 
West (2001). He wrote, ‘Public homosexuality, pornography, abortion, 
trash talks on TV and in movies, and filthy lyrics in popular music have 
all been around since before they [new generation] can remember… It is 
the traditional culture they find odd’. The following 17 years aggravated 
the situation, having added a dozen new ‘non-traditional generations’. 
Demography 
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The muddy waters of the marketed mass culture flooded many a country 
and the Internet is ready to bury the whole world beneath them. Unfortu-
nately, this flood did not bypass Russia and many other states. Undoubt-
edly, this had a negative effect on the demographic development of the 
affected countries. 
Despite a slight increase in the birth rate and a reduction in the mor-
tality rate observed in 2010—2015, Russia is drowning ever deeper in the 
demographic crisis brought about, primarily, by negative changes in the 
Russian youth, which has grown susceptible to marketed mass culture 
and demographic surrogates. The latter is facilitated by not only the Inter-
net but also mass media and, especially, ‘our own’ television. As 
S. P. Kapitsa stressed in his article ‘Russia is Being Turned into a Land of 
Fools’, television is engaged in ‘corrupting the consciousness of people’, 
which is, in essence, a criminal act. Over the eight years, the situation has 
not improved in the least. ‘What a disappointment! The fool is being 
cherished, the fool is being nurtured, the fool is being nourished, and 
there is no end in sight…’ [22, p. 126]. Thus, one may assume that, if the 
number of ‘fools’ or ‘decay-bringing individuals’ continues to increase, 
soon it will be too late to speak of the demographic renaissance in Russia. 
Any renaissance would be impossible with such a population. The same 
has been stressed by Sarrazin in the case of Germany and by Buchanan in 
the case of the US. The goal of the healthy part of our society and the 
leadership of the country and its regions is to prevent this situation. To 
this end, one must at least acknowledge the harmfulness of the current 
demographic development, which, in part, is the result of the raging in-
formation war. 
Our efforts to develop the concept of the ‘Eurasian demographic tran-
sition’ [23, pp. 463—464], which can embrace different models of de-
mographic development, are aimed against the above-described ‘univer-
sality’ of the Western demographic transition and the spread of mass-
culture demographic values across the world. In the case of Russia, the 
Eurasian model rests on the concept of the fourth demographic transition 
[8, pp. 15—21; 1, pp. 80—84], which incorporates the basic Eurasian 
demographic values (a major one being healthy children) and principles 
(a harmonious coexistence of cultures). From the perspective of demo-
graphic development, the mentioned principle is crucial. 
The concept of the fourth demographic transition, proposed by V. A. Ion-
tsev in 2010 as an alternative to Coleman’s scenario, considers migration 
as an entirely positive phenomenon, which can have negative consequen-
ces only if its essence is misinterpreted and the relevant national policy is 
flawed. A positive phenomenon, migration can have a beneficial effect 
on the future demographic development, if the national interests are taken 
into account and marriages between the native population and immi-
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grants are encouraged. Children born from such marriages will create the 
core of the ‘new population’ that will have better reproductive attitudes 
and qualitative characteristics meeting the 21st-century national needs. 
Note that the number of such marriages is constantly increasing in 
many countries, including Russia and Germany. According to the Federal 
Statistical Office of Germany, transnational marriages accounted for 11 % 
of all marital unions. Russia has witnessed an increase in the number of 
transnational marriages since 1959. The 1989 census recorded 12.8 million 
such marriages (17.5 %). In today’s Russia, this trend is continuing. 
It is important to understand when speaking of quantitative and quali-
tative changes in the population — the more so when the negative ones 
are considered — that the two types of changes are interrelated. ‘Sick’ 
parents usually give birth to even ‘sicker’ children, whose future children 
will probably be unable to produce a new generation. Many of these 
‘grandchildren’ may not be even able to reach the reproductive age (for 
instance, drug-addicted infants). Therefore, one generation later, negative 
qualitative changes may have a negative effect on fertility, mortality, and 
other demographic processes. Unfortunately, this is already happening in 
Russia and Germany. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Both qualitative and quantitative measures presented in Table 2 sig-
nificantly aggravate the demographic situation that has developed over 
the past 35 years. Common to Russia and Germany is that, in the past 
decades, they have experienced depopulation as a result of low fertility, 
which rapidly leads to an increase in the proportion of the senior popula-
tion and, thus, to problems associated with demographic ageing. In Rus-
sia, the elderly account for almost 20 % whereas the population of Ger-
many is ageing at an even greater rate (the proportion of senior citizens is 
above 27 %). In Russia and Germany, depopulation has reached an ex-
treme level, which is manifested in the natural population decline. In 
Russia, this process started in 1992. The 20-year population loss (1992—
2012) reached 13.5 million people. In Germany, where the natural popu-
lation decline was observed as early as 1971—1972, the population loss 
of 1980—2012 reached 3.42 million people. However, the level of losses 
is decreasing. It amounted to 90,000 in 2015 against 846,000 in 2005. 
Unfortunately, this trend, which is expected to accelerate in Germany, is 
not observed in Russia (see Table 2). In recent years, Russia’s working-
age population (aged 15—59) has declined at a rate of 1 million people 
per year. Actually, Germany’s working-age population is also declining. 
Since 2016, the least numerous generation of females born in the 1990s 
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has been reaching childbearing age. This exerts an additional negative 
effect on fertility and aggravates the already grim demographic situation 
in the country. Moreover, there is an urgent need for a special attention to 
the quality and rearing of children. 
Having assumed office on May 7, 2018, President Putin signed the 
decree ‘On the National Targets and Strategic Goals of the Development 
of the Russian Federation until 2024’. As one of the goals, the document 
mentions an increase in healthy life expectancy up to 67 years in 2024. 
This testifies to the fact that the improvement of qualitative characteris-
tics of the population has finally attracted attention [24]. 
Thus, Germany and, even to a greater degree, Russia are faced with 
the choice of a demographic development path. This also holds true for 
the neighbouring countries. We believe that the best option for these 
states is the Eurasian demographic transition, which takes into account a 
country’s geographical position, traditions, culture, mentality, and demo-
graphic values, a major one being ‘healthy and intelligent children’. For 
Germany, a leading destination for migrants, — such a scenario may also 
prove helpful. If the country continues to develop within the framework 
of the second demographic transition, until the end of the century, Ger-
many may cease to exist as a German state. A similar fate may await 
Russia and many other Baltic Sea states — especially, in view of their 
small populations and negative net migration — if they do not abandon 
the negative Western trend of demographic development. 
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